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I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter surveys the literature on alternatives to intellectual property, 
focusing especially on alternatives to patent law, but with some attention as well to 
copyright. It does not consider the question whether intellectual property rights are 
justified, but assumes that absent some form of governmental innovation, 
inventions and works of authorship might be underproduced relative to the social 
optimum. The chapter thus considers how institutions besides traditional property 
rights compare relative to one another and to traditional intellectual property 
systems. The chapter considers only briefly the possibility that government itself 
might produce inventions and works of authorship or that government might 
indirectly produce these by funding research. A considerable literature already 
exists on governmental peer review and research administration, and so these 
mechanisms are considered only insofar as they compare to the institutions that are 
the primary focus of this chapter, prize and reward systems. 
A prize or reward system is one in which the government gives an award to 
a person or entity that has produced an invention or work deemed socially valuable, 
based on an assessment of the contribution of that invention or work. The chapter 
will use the word “prize” to describe systems that give an award only to a single 
contributor or small group of contributors, based for example on who has given the 
best contribution in a designated area or who is first to have solved a particular 
problem. A “reward system,” by contrast, will be used to refer to a system in which 
funds are available for a large number of contributors, to be distributed based on 
assessments of the quality of their contributions. As Burstein & Murray (2015) 
note, much of the academic focus has been on reward systems, but prizes have 
enjoyed more recent policy prominence. 
As the prize-reward distinction suggests, there are many ways in which 
prize and reward systems can be structured. The form of the award may vary, 
consisting usually of cash but sometimes of other governmental benefits. In some 
proposals, the total award is a fixed amount, but in others, the total award may vary 
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depending on the assessed quality of the contributions. An award system may be 
an optional alternative to an intellectual property system, or could be instituted as 
an exclusive alternative. A system may cover a wide range of possible inventions 
or works, or it may target a particular type of invention or work, such as 
pharmaceuticals or songs.  
Perhaps most importantly, prize and reward systems may differ in the 
mechanisms used to assess the quality of the contributions. One approach is for the 
government to observe market behavior in an effort to estimate the demand for a 
new invention or work and the improvement in social welfare produced by its 
release into the public domain. Such observation might be conducted by an 
administrative agency or through judicial proceedings, for example in a takings suit. 
Some commentators have sought to identify the specific formulas that government 
should use in conducting valuation, while others have argued that the government 
should have substantial freedom to take into account a wide range of considerations 
in making assessments of contributions. Meanwhile, other contributors have argued 
that to restrict dangers associated with governmental discretion, a market 
mechanism should be used to assess contributions. 
The effectiveness of the valuation mechanism is critical to an assessment of 
how alternatives to intellectual property compare to traditional intellectual property 
systems. If the government miscalibrates awards, then these awards can lead to 
production of inventions and works that add little to social welfare and may thus 
produce lower value than alternative uses of governmental funds, including tax 
reductions. On the other hand, if the government can accurately measure social 
welfare, then a prize or reward system may contribute substantially to social value. 
If social benefits of an invention or work are a substantial multiple of the cost of 
incentivizing its production, then the social benefits of a prize or reward program 
may be positive. A full accounting, however, must account for any reduction in 
social welfare attributable to the need to raise sufficient tax revenue to accomplish 
the program. 
 In the real world, of course, neither a prize or reward system nor a system 
of intellectual property rights will perfectly calibrate incentives and lead private 
parties to undertake all investments in the creation of inventions and works that 
have a positive social return. A critical virtue of intellectual property systems is that 
they minimize governmental discretion in assessing the value of works. But the 
need to determine when to grant intellectual property rights and to adjudicate the 
propriety of and infringement of such rights dictates a considerable governmental 
role. Thus, the effectiveness of a patent office and the courts are critical to assessing 
how existing intellectual property systems compare to prize or reward systems. To 
the extent that intellectual property systems do constrain administrative and judicial 
discretion with rules, the question becomes to what extent the rules successfully 
align creator incentives with social welfare.  
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 In principle, the ultimate comparison of prize systems with intellectual 
property systems is an empirical one. This chapter will provide some historical 
context, but there is little empirical data, particularly on the prize or reward system 
side of the ledger. And even to the extent some experimentation with prize or 
reward systems has occurred, the heterogeneity of such systems counsels restraint 
in attributing the virtues or vices of any one such system to all of them. Of course, 
it is also important not to compare some hypothetical ideal prize or reward system 
against a functioning intellectual property system. After all, there are many 
competing proposals to improve patent and copyright law, and even if there were 
broad scholarly agreement about the design of an ideal system, political 
considerations may make suboptimal intellectual property inevitable—and would 
likely mean the same for a prize or reward system. 
 This review thus does not seek to determine whether intellectual property 
systems should be abandoned in favor of prize or reward systems or whether the 
latter should be introduced as a complement to the latter. Rather, it is to provide an 
overview of the theoretical terrain, to identify the potential weaknesses of prize or 
reward systems and to point out analogous imperfections in our existing intellectual 
property system. The chapter will highlight some considerations, such as incentives 
to commercialize inventions or works, transactions and administrative costs, and 
rent-seeking costs, which are sometimes omitted from the intellectual property 
calculus, but must be taken into account in a full comparison of intellectual property 
to prize or reward systems. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. Part II will provide an overview of the 
history and early scholarship on prize and reward systems, including nineteenth 
century antecedents and contemporary prizes and proposals. Part III considers 
administrative design issues, other than valuation. This includes questions such as 
the choice between prizes and rewards, whether awards should be general or 
targeted, and how international coordination of prize or reward systems could work. 
Part IV then turns to valuation mechanisms, considering traditional administrative 
and judicial mechanisms, as well as market mechanisms. Finally, Part V compares 
prize-or-reward systems to the existing intellectual property system. 
II. HISTORY AND SEMINAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Governmental prizes at one time represented a significant component of 
governmental innovation policy and appeared to be a serious competitor to 
traditional intellectual property systems. As documented by Burrell and Kelly 
(2014), Parliament gave numerous invention awards from 1732 to 1840 based on 
its institutional assessment of the contribution of inventions. Parliament was also 
in the business of granting patent term extensions on an ad hoc basis and thus used 
its discretion in both types of systems. Burrell and Kelly argue that the shift from 
prizes to patents changed not so much because of a perception that intellectual 
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property systems were inherently superior to prize systems, but because 
Parliament’s “role began to shift from that of a grand tribunal for the nation to 
something more like that of a dedicated legislature.” (p. 885) Parliament’s failure, 
however, to vest prize discretion in some other administrative institution, along 
with the failure of other countries to create prize systems on the scale of England’s, 
suggests the existence of some distrust of prize systems. 
In the heyday of prizes, Parliament did not always reserve to itself the right 
to adjudicate prizes, but instead often resorted to administrative determinations. 
This was true of what is undoubtedly the most famous invention prize in history, 
the prize for a method for precise determination of longitude at sea. The Board of 
Longitude gave awards for two rival approaches to the problem, one involving a 
method of lunar distance calculation, and the other depending on accurate time-
keeping. Howse (1998). Navigators could identify high noon local time, so if a 
timepiece informed them of the time at the port of origin, they could extrapolate 
the extent of a ship’s progress around the globe. A modern debate relevant to prize 
systems generally is whether the Board was excessively stingy with John Harrison, 
who invented a timepiece allegedly capable of functioning on water, perhaps 
because he was a carpenter rather than a member of the scientific establishment. 
Sobel (1995) intimates that the Board failed to discharge its duty properly, though 
Siegel (2009) argues that the Board’s reluctance to grant a full award to Harrison 
resulted from Harrison’s inability to provide a method of replicating his timepieces. 
Siegel argues, “Even in the relatively simple case wherein the legislature sought to 
promote a solution to a single, specific problem, and in which a single, discrete 
product embodied the sought-after innovation, Parliament could not usefully 
specify the test that would determine whether the invention had won the prize in a 
way that would eliminate the need for administrative discretion.” (p. 61) The tale 
can thus be seen as a cautionary one about governmental abuse of discretion or as 
one highlighting the difficulty of constructing ex ante rules and the advantages of 
flexibility inherent in prize systems.  
Prizes had a less central role in England in the second half of the 19th 
century, but prizes were still given in some sectors. Brunt et al. (2012) analyze 
annual competitions held by the Royal Agricultural Society from 1839-1939, 
including 1,986 awards from 15,032 entries. (p. 658) It is difficult to use 
econometrics to assess the incentive effects of prizes, for the same reason that it is 
difficult to assess the incentive effects of intellectual property; ordinarily, there is 
no control group. Brunt et al., however, exploit a system by which the areas in 
which prizes were offered rotated from here to year over a 15 year period, and they 
find that the availability of prizes in a particular increased inventions in the relevant 
art. Because the prize system was a complement to the patent system, the increase 
in invention was manifested by an increase in patenting activity in the area covered 
by the prize system in the time around the show. Similarly, Moser and Nicholas 
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(2013) analyze the effects of prizes at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851. They 
show that technologies that won prizes were more likely to receive patents than 
technologies that did not win a prize. This may demonstrate that there were positive 
reputational benefits from receiving prizes beyond the money offered or that judges 
were skilled at identifying patentable inventions. Moser and Nicholas argue for the 
former interpretation. 
Prizes also existed in other countries. Indeed, a number of countries had 
offered a longitude prize before the prize that Harrison claimed. Nicholas (2013) 
documents an extensive system of prizes in 19th century Japan. Adopting an 
approach similar to that of Brunt et al., Nicholas exploits variation in the size of 
prizes over time to estimate the degree to which prizes affected innovation. He finds 
a significant effect when measuring innovation based on patenting activity. Prizes 
were granted in individual prefectures rather than nationally, and Nicholas argues 
that “within the host prefecture the cost of the prize contests was high relative to 
the value of patent capital they created.” (p. 596) Adjoining prefectures enjoyed 
significant knowledge spillovers from these competitions. Nicholas’s historical 
account highlights a potential problem with prize proposals that we will consider 
below: that a jurisdiction that sponsors a prize may not be able to appropriate a high 
percentage of the benefits from invention. This problem is, of course, particularly 
acute in the modern world as a result of international information flows. 
Intellectual property systems gradually began to dominate prize systems 
throughout the world in the nineteenth century. Perhaps this occurred in part 
because patent systems were constructed in a general way so that any inventor 
meeting the specified criteria could benefit from them, while prizes were given 
sporadically and in an ad hoc manner. Some commentators, however, urged the 
prizes be given in lieu of monopoly rights granted by patents. R.A. Macfie (1883, 
p. vi), for example, argued, “In every patent there should be a condition that the 
State, from public moneys, or moneys supplied by individuals, shall be entitled to 
demand that the value of the invention be estimated, and, on this value being paid 
(with a liberal percentage added in consideration of ‘compulsory sale’), the use of 
the invention should become free to all the Queen’s subjects (even in the Colonies, 
so far as privileges granted there do not clash).” Macfie collects early commentary 
on prize systems, including a proposal by Sir John Sinclair that recognized the 
international dimension of the problem and proposed an agreement among the 
European powers and the United States to reward inventors, as well as a proposal 
by Sir David Brewster for creating a Board of “scientific and practical” men to 
administer a prize system. (pp. 33-34) 
By the twentieth century, prizes largely faded in the public consciousness 
as a method for encouraging invention, but there were occasional proposals to 
revive them. For example, Polanvyi (1944) adopted a theme similar to Macfie’s, 
highlighting the costs of monopoly. He argued that “[i]n order that inventions may 
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be used freely by all, we must relieve inventors of the necessity of earning their 
rewards commercially and must grant them instead the right to be rewarded from 
the public purse.” (p. 65) Polanvyi envisioned not eliminating the patent system, 
but grafting onto it a system of compulsory licenses. Meanwhile, the modern 
economic literature on prizes dates to Wright (1983), who compares the costs and 
benefits of patents, prizes, and research grants. Wright formalizes Macfie’s and 
Polanvyi’s concerns about monopolization, showing that prizes can improve 
efficiency by eliminating the deadweight loss associated with pricing of patented 
products and services above marginal cost. He also addresses a number of other 
issues that we will explore below, such as the danger of excessive research into 
particular inventions. 
 The law and economics of prizes began to receive sustained academic 
attention in literature beginning in the 1990s. There was also a concomitant increase 
in the use of prizes as a mechanism for encouraging innovation. Prior to that, there 
were some instances in which governments encouraged research through prizes. 
For example, the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 
60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g), created a board to 
give rewards for military energy innovations, but there are few other examples. In 
recent years, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has 
offered numerous prizes. (Schotchmer 2004, p. 2). Other governmental prizes 
include the Department of Defense Wearable Power Prize, the Department of 
Energy Grand Challenges, and the NASA Centennial Challenges. Stine (2009). 
Congress required the National Science Foundation to create a program to fund 
innovation inducement prizes. Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-108 (109th Cong. 2006).  
Meanwhile, Senator Bernie Sanders proposed replacing the patent system for 
pharmaceuticals with a reward system. Medical Innovation Prize Fund act, S. 1137, 
112th Cong. (2011). The lack of any other apparent support in Congress highlights, 
however, that while prize systems have received support as accessories to the patent 
system in discrete areas, there appears to be little chance of instituting a 
comprehensive reward system, especially one that would displace the patent 
system, in the near future. 
There has also been increased private interest in prizes, particularly for 
philanthropic purposes. For example, the Virgin Earth Challenge offers a $25 
million prize for inventions that might combat global warning by anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases. (Adler 2011). The Ansari X-Prize has offered $10 million for the 
development of reusable manned aircraft, and numerous other prizes exist as well. 
(McKinsey & Co. 2009) Murray et al. (2012, p. 1791) argue that the various private 
prizes “blend a myriad of complex goals, including attention, education, awareness, 
credibility and demonstrating the viability of alternatives.” Burstein & Murray 
(2015) offer a detailed study of one such prize, the Progressive Insurance 
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Automotive X Prize, explaining how it achieves innovation goals that help to 
overcome information asymmetries and significant uncertainty. Because prizes are 
still relatively rare, they may generate more publicity than other means of privately 
funding innovation, such as research grants. Adler (2011, p. 16) notes that this has 
sometimes led to investments much larger in total than the value of the prize. This 
also may help explain the relative popularity of prize systems compared to reward 
systems. A caution is that if benefits are attributable to publicity, any successes 
attributable to prizes might not scale if a prize or reward system were increased to 
near the size of the patent system. Burstein & Murray (2015) argue that prize 
systems may not scale as well as the patent system or other reward systems. 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGN ISSUES 
A. Timing of Payment 
Both prize and reward systems generally make awards after the relevant 
research, inventions, or work are complete, in contrast to research grants, which are 
generally given ex ante based on specification of research to be conducted. Because 
awards are granted ex post, inventors or creators must raise funds necessary to 
conduct the research or create the work. Bakker (2013, p. 1811) argues that before 
1750, the time lag made prizes a relatively ineffective method of inducing inventive 
activity. With capital markets, however, prizes in theory should be capable of 
encouraging activity to be performed before awards will be made. Venture 
capitalists or banks thus serve a role in assessing research plans under a prize 
system, and a cost of the system is that they must be compensated for their labor 
and the risk that they undertake. This may also make it difficult to offer 
exceptionally large prizes; Kalil (2006, p. 7) speculates that a prize system might 
not be able to induce sufficient private investment in a new particle accelerator for 
theoretical physics research. Brennan et al. (2012, p. 4) argue that an assessment of 
who can best bear risk is essential to evaluation of a prize system, stating that 
“prizes are likely to be better when the needs can be specified, necessary or 
preferred technological solutions are not known, and the procuring party needs to 
share the risk by guaranteeing a minimum return to the first successful innovator.”  
The payment of prizes and rewards after research is complete still leaves a 
number of decisions concerning the payout approach. The payout can occur as soon 
as research is complete, though Abramowicz (2003) argues that payments should 
be delayed to provide better information to decisionmakers about the contribution 
of inventions. Especially if the intellectual property system is retained and a prize 
or reward system is an option, this can reduce the danger of an adverse selection 
problem in which only those inventors with “lemons” agree to forego their 
intellectual property rights in exchange for a prize or reward. Love and Hubbard 
(2007, pp. 1539-40) suggest that payouts be made over time, with subsequent 
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payments changing based on observation of markets. Similarly, Williams (2012, p. 
772) urges that some payment be made based on adherence to technical 
requirements, but additional payments should be based on whether an invention 
achieves sufficient market acceptance. 
B. Cash vs. Other Incentives 
Virtually all proposals assume that the benefits to be granted by the 
government will come in the form of cash. Galle (2014, p. 881) notes, however, 
that some cash prizes may “reduce positive contributions from inframarginal 
producers by crowding out their internal motivation” and thus noncash prizes may 
sometimes be superior. Prizes can also provide financial benefits without directly 
providing cash. Ridley et al. (2006) suggest that a prize might be the right to obtain 
expedited review of another drug. This proposal was adopted into law, with respect 
to specified diseases, by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007, § 1102, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360n, which created a system of priority 
review vouchers. Similarly, Fisher and Syed (2012, p. 16) note the possibility that 
pharmaceutical companies might be rewarded for creating a medication for poor 
consumers by having patent life extended on some other drug. Of course, the 
government would need to exercise discretion in determining how much patent life 
to grant. Wright (1983) notes that the fact that the government does not generally 
tailor patent terms to inventions suggests a concern that government may not 
exercise its discretion well, a concern that might affect both cash and other prizes.  
Another alternative to cash prizes is for the government to purchase 
innovative products and services for itself or to help consumers with such 
purchases. Lichtman (1997) argues that the government might be able to reduce 
deadweight loss more cheaply by giving coupons for pharmaceuticals to the poorest 
consumers than by buying out the patent. His model assumes linear demand and 
that the government knows the most each consumer is willing to pay for a product. 
If the government gives coupons to just one-quarter of customers, in magnitudes 
just large enough to bring them up to the top of the bottom quartile, then the 
pharmaceutical patent owner’s incentive will be to lower the price so that it can get 
gain sales from these customers, as well as from the next quartile of consumers. Of 
course, Lichtman recognizes that the government will not have perfect information, 
but he argues that if the government can spend just 1 in 8 dollars correctly, this 
approach may be more effective dollar-for-dollar than a patent buyout. Lichtman 
also notes that the government may have tax data and other data enabling the 
government to make fine-grained assessments of consumer valuations. 
If, however, the government gives coupons to some consumers who would 
not need them, then that would not merely undermine the government’s plan by 
leading to unnecessary spending, but would also reduce the pharmaceutical patent 
owner’s incentive to lower prices to capture the consumers with coupons. 
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Abramowicz (2003) offers a simulation model varying the quality of the 
government’s estimates of demand. With sufficiently good governmental 
information, coupons will be cheaper per dollar of deadweight loss removed than 
patent buyouts. But below some point, patent buyouts are likely to be more 
expensive. This simulation still assumes linear demand, however. Fisher and Syed 
(2012, p. 21) argue that this assumption is unrealistic in the context of drugs in the 
developing world, because the vast majority of consumers are able to pay very little 
in comparison to consumers in the developed world. One could argue that their 
poverty gives these consumers low valuations of the drugs, however, and that the 
deadweight loss from their exclusion from the market is low. Fisher and Syed’s 
argument depends on the proposition that willingness to pay is not a valid basis for 
assessing social welfare and that alternative means of achieving redistribution are 
not viable. 
C. Variable vs. Fixed Payments 
Concerns about governmental exercise of discretion are also central to the 
decision of whether to grant a fixed prize or a variable reward. Clancy and Moschini 
(2013) offer a model showing that ideally the government would offer rewards 
equal to the social innovation value. With a guaranteed prize at a certain level, the 
system cannot take advantage of private researchers’ information about the 
expected value of inventions that they might create; Wright (1983, p. 704) notes 
that the absence of such information creates an informational advantage of patents 
over prizes. A guaranteed prize may also be problematic if the winner of a contest 
may opt for some other form of compensation, such as the patent or copyright 
system, instead of the contest. Ding & Wolfsetetter (2011) note that if a prize is set 
too low, only those with low contributions that would not fare well on the market 
will submit their work for the prize.  
Another approach, initially suggested by Abramowicz (2003), is to have a 
fixed “pot” to be distributed among an unknown number of contributions in 
proportion to assessments of the value of the contributions. Hollis and Pogge (2008) 
elaborate how this might be used in the context of pharmaceuticals. Love and 
Hubbard (2007, p. 1536) argue that a benefit of this approach is that it provides a 
government assurance of how much it will have to pay. A fixed pot reduces the 
risk, cited by Wright (1983, p. 703), that with a variable prize, the government may 
lowball its evaluation in the hope of spending money. As Wright recognizes, 
however, if a reward system is repeated over time, the government will have at least 
some reputational incentives not to renege on its commitments. Another 
disadvantage of both the fixed pot and the fixed single prize relative to variable 
prizes is that these mechanisms do not tend to move the system toward the point 
where the marginal benefit of prizes equals the marginal cost. If the government 
can be trusted to value inventions based on social welfare, then the system should 
  ALTERNATIVES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY     11 
 
 
   
 
equilibrate at this point without further governmental invention to increase the size 
of the prize pool. 
D. Mandatory vs. Optional 
Whether payments are fixed or variable, a critical question is whether 
participation in the system is optional, in which case participants may choose 
whether to seek traditional intellectual property rights instead, or mandatory. 
Shavell and van Ypersele (2001) note that adverse selection is a potential drawback 
of an optional system. They assume that an inventor knows the demand for an 
invention created, but the government does not, so the only inventors to choose a 
prize will be those who expect to be overcompensated relative to the patent system. 
To the extent that the patent system’s valuations are correlated with social value, 
this creates a lemons problem. To combat this problem, the government can offer a 
reward corresponding to the lowest possible demand for the inventor’s product, 
based on the government’s calculations. Alternatively, the government might offer 
higher rewards, thus inducing greater participation (and greater reduction of 
deadweight loss) but at some cost of unnecessary payments. 
Love and Hubbard (2007) defend a mandatory system, particularly in the 
pharmaceuticals context. A mandatory system eliminates the transactions costs 
associated with patents and guarantees to researchers and entrepreneurs that they 
need not clear rights to existing technology. A disadvantage of a mandatory system 
is that it makes it more difficult to experiment and transition, though a mandatory 
system might be introduced for some relatively small class of inventions. An 
additional disadvantage is that if the government pays too little, there will be no 
alternative system for encouraging innovation. With an optional system, low 
governmental payments may reduce social welfare but only by reducing the 
benefits associated with the prize system; the traditional intellectual property 
system can continue to function.  
E. General vs. Targeted 
In principle, proposals that target pharmaceuticals could be broadened to 
cover any form of intellectual property. Indeed, commentators often argue that 
intellectual property works relatively well in the context of pharmaceuticals in 
contrast to other areas of patent law, because patent scope can be relatively clearly 
defined, so the focus on pharmaceuticals may seem inappropriate. Kremer and 
Williams (2010), however, argue that an alternative to the intellectual property 
system might be tried in specific sectors before it is generalized, and Fisher and 
Syed (2012) argue that there are some factors that make pharmaceuticals a 
particularly appropriate area for experimentation. They note that “government 
agencies regularly collect and assess data concerning the incidence and impact of 
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diseases and thus are well positioned to ascertain the welfare gains that could be 
reaped by developing and distributing vaccines or treatments for each ailment.” (p. 
3) 
The advantage of a more general system is that it may be able to stimulate 
precisely those innovations that are underfunded by the patent system. Abramowicz 
(2003) notes that with a fixed pot, inventors are most likely to opt in if they believe 
that the inventions that they will produce will have high measured social welfare 
relative to the private gains that could be appropriated through a patent. This could 
reflect a form of adverse selection, but only if there are reasons to believe that the 
social welfare calculations will be systematically inaccurate. Fisher and Syed 
likewise argue that targeting a fund toward specific diseases, rather than to 
pharmaceuticals in general might be a mistake, because a more general prize fund 
will tend to stimulate work on inventions that are expected to have large impacts 
on welfare that cannot easily be monetized by the patent system.  
F. International Coordination 
International harmonization has reduced the ability of countries to free-ride 
on the intellectual property system, though at the cost of greatly reduced access to 
inventions, particularly pharmaceutical inventions, in the developed world. If 
individual countries gave prizes or rewards to inventors or creators of works in an 
uncoordinated way, then there would be incentives to free-ride. Duffy (2004a, p. 
54) notes that each government “has incentives to behave strategically in 
contributing toward the reward.” A government might not give prizes or rewards 
but still reap the benefits of innovations generated from prizes or rewards. A partial 
response for this is to grant prizes or rewards solely based on contribution to the 
jurisdiction providing the prizes or rewards. Calandrillo (1998, p. 354) suggests 
offering awards based on use and utility as observed in the jurisdiction providing 
awards. If, for example, the United States alone offered prizes, innovators would 
still be able to exploit their intellectual property in other countries. This would have 
the benefit of reducing free-riding, but of course would mean continued difficulty 
in the developed world accessing patented inventions. 
If, however, countries can choose whether to offer intellectual property or 
rewards, then there may be a strategic incentive to offer rewards but then to 
undervalue the rewards. In principle, a system of harmonization could seek to 
ensure that countries (or perhaps, only developed countries) offer rewards offer 
them at a sufficiently high level and also that countries do not discriminate against 
foreign inventors and creators in paying rewards. Meanwhile, if some countries 
offered rewards while others offered intellectual property, this could mean that 
inventors would face increased transactions costs, reducing some of the benefits 
that have been achieved from international cooperate among patent offices. These 
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issues would be reduced if inventors and creators could opt into a prize or reward 
system but still retain their intellectual property rights.  
In theory, it might be possible to create a system of international 
coordination and harmonization for prize and reward systems. It also might be 
possible that the developed countries would agree to underwrite an international 
prize fund to benefit the developing world, as suggested by Stiglitz (2006). But any 
such initiatives could require a long time and a great deal of diplomatic effort. 
Under current law, it is not clear whether it is even permissible for a country to 
abandon intellectual property for a reward system. Fisher and Syed (2012, p. 34) 
argue that a mandatory system would violate the TRIPS agreement, article 27 of 
which requires that “patents shall be available for any inventions … in all fields of 
technology.” Article 30, however, permits “limited exceptions [that] do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.” Perhaps the 
alternative revenue provided by a prize or reward system would lead to a conclusion 
that such a system would not prejudice rights holders’ interests.  
IV. VALUATION OF INVENTIONS AND WORKS 
By far the most important practical problem in design of a reward system is 
the challenge of valuing contributions. (A prize system avoids this problem to some 
extent by setting fixed prizes in advance, though that means that the government 
must at least be able to determine how much to offer for particular types of 
inventions.) As Roin (2014, p. 1035) notes, “Social value is notoriously difficult to 
measure objectively in most circumstances, and measuring the social value of 
innovations—which are unique goods by definition—may be particularly 
difficult.” While we will explicitly compare prize and reward systems to traditional 
intellectual property in Part V, the question whether a particular prize or reward 
system would track social value better than traditional intellectual property looms 
large in the calculation. 
As a preliminary matter, one must have a handle on what counts as the social 
value that a prize-or-reward system should be awarding. Several points are worth 
making. First, the baseline target is the gross social surplus from invention. One 
should not subtract the inventor’s direct costs or the cost of risk facing the inventor. 
The assumption underlying both traditional intellectual property and a prize-or-
reward system is that private incentives will align with social ones if creators expect 
to receive the gross social surplus, because they will invest until the marginal 
increase in expected gross social surplus increases the marginal cost of investment. 
To be sure, what ultimately matters is the net surplus, but we will assume that if the 
inventor receives an award equivalent to gross surplus, the inventor will have 
incentives to optimize net surplus. Consistent with this observation, existing 
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intellectual property systems do not concern themselves with how much the 
inventor has invested. 
Second, a payment to a creator should ideally net out the value of any 
independent rents that the creator receives for the creation. Suppose, for example, 
that by inventing a new flying car, an inventor would receive substantial first-mover 
advantages, aided by the trademark system. If a reward system is used as an 
alternative to a patent system, then the ideal reward would be equal to the social 
benefits of the flying car minus the rents the inventor receives naturally or with the 
help of trademark law. A reward system that paid the full social value of an 
invention and also allowed inventors to appropriate value for it in other ways would 
be overcompensating inventors, leading to investments past the point at which the 
marginal social benefits justified the cost. 
Third, and more subtly, the payment should also net out gross social surplus 
that would have been achieved absent the invention without the incentive of the 
reward system but will not be achieved as a result of the invention. This can be 
relevant when an inventor’s diligence leads to a discovery shortly before it would 
have been made in the absence of a patent or reward system. Because invention is 
cumulative, sometimes Invention A makes it possible to invent Invention B. If 
Invention B would have been invented soon even if no patent or reward incentive 
existed, then the only increase in social welfare that should be attributable to 
Invention B should be any acceleration in invention that occurred as a result of the 
reward system. The analogous point in the patent context is that the nonobvious 
doctrine should depend on whether an invention was induced by the patent system. 
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966); Abramowicz and Duffy 
(2011). 
A. Measurement Based on Use 
Perhaps the most obvious approach to assessing the social value of an 
invention is to measure use of the product by consumers. This might be 
accomplished either by forcing some consumers to pay for the product or to 
consider purchases by consumers of the product once it is placed in the public 
domain. Guell and Fischbaum (1995, p. 225), who propose patent buyouts for 
pharmaceutical products, suggest that the pharmaceutical be sold initially in a test 
market. Shavell and van Ypersele (2001) suggest that the government wait until the 
product is placed in the public domain and the government observes the goods sold.  
This approach runs into at least three significant difficulties. First, there is 
not an identity between a patented invention and a consumer product. Abramowicz 
(2003, p. 143). (There often is an identity, however, between a copyrighted work 
and a consumer product, so this approach may be easier to implement in the 
copyright context.) Often, many innovations are inputs into a single product, and 
an innovation may be an input into many different products. Hopenhayn et al. 
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(2006, p. 1047). A further complication, identified by Chari et al. (2012), is that 
producers may have an incentive to manipulate market signals about the value of 
their inventions, for example by bribing other producers. Chari et al. conclude that 
the relative strength of patents and reward system depends on how costly it is for 
producers to manipulate market signals.  
Second, measurement can be difficult even when there is an identity 
between product and contribution. One problem, identified by Coase (1946) and 
applied to the patent reward context by Duffy (2004a), is that buyouts can cause 
misallocations of resources even where a good is used. For example, government 
transportation may lead consumers to live inefficiently far from a city. The fact that 
consumers take advantage of the transport does not mean that they value it at the 
cost of the production. The relevant question is how much consumers “would have 
demanded the good if government policy were different and they had expected to 
pay the full cost of the product.” (p. 43). Duffy points out that we should like to 
know the most that consumers would pay for a product, but “the government will 
have no data to answer that question because consumers are not paying full costs 
and never expected to do so.” (Duffy, p. 43). Meanwhile, manipulation by 
producers can cause distortions. Roin (2014, p. 1037 n.174, pp. 1059-60) observes 
that producers may sell goods below marginal cost to inflate apparent demand, not 
only thwarting value measurement but also leading to inefficient overuse. 
Third, even measurement of use may face administrative complications. For 
a pharmaceutical, whose use is probably considerably easier to measure than many 
other inventions’, we would need to be able to determine total manufacturing by 
generic firms, perhaps not an insurmountable problem but one requiring some 
degree of coordination. Sometimes, once use is known, it may be possible to 
estimate consumer value, subject to the objections above, but often, the government 
may take shortcuts, such as assuming benefits based on clinical trials. Hollis and 
Pogge (2008, pp. 30-31) point out that this approach may be flawed, because 
clinical trials may feature the consumers most likely to benefit from an invention. 
B. Market Mechanisms 
An alternative approach, or perhaps sometimes a complementary one, is to 
use a market mechanism to estimate the value of intellectual property forfeited by 
its owner in exchange for a buyout price. Of course, such a system can function 
only as an adjunct to the existing intellectual property system. The mechanism in 
the literature that has received the most attention is offered by Kremer (1998), who 
suggests allowing an optional system in which an inventor can submit an invention 
for an auction to the public. With some small probability, the auction is 
consummated; the rest of the time, the invention is placed in the public domain. (p. 
1147) The virtue of this system is that the government can harness private 
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information. The government pays the patent owner an amount based on the bids 
when the auction is not consummated. 
The system, however, invites a number of objections. A patentee might 
make side payments to bidders. Collusion can even include implicitly; a company 
might bid often on another company’s intellectual property in the hope of 
reciprocation. Kremer suggests combating this by paying some multiple of the 
third-highest bid. (p. 1158) The effectiveness of this solution depends on the 
number of plausible bidders. More generally, an auction might not be competitive, 
especially for exceptionally valuable intellectual property. It may not be 
worthwhile to undertake the expense of researching the value of intellectual 
property if there is only a small probability that the sale will be consummated. 
Clancy & Moschini (2013, p. 229) notes also that potential bidders must have 
sufficient information to make meaningful evaluations. In addition, truly random 
assignment will lead to some patents being kept in private hands. “The government 
must be willing to allow the cure for AIDS to remain in private hands if random 
chance would have it.” (Duffy 2004a, p. 48) 
A more complex problem that Kremer addresses is that different patents 
may be substitutes or complements. If two patents are complements, rewards may 
be too high if they are auctioned separately; given the high probability each of two 
perfect complements will be assigned to the public domain, the other will command 
nearly the full value of both together. Meanwhile, the value of one patent will be 
greatly lowered if a substitute patent will likely be placed in the public domain. 
Kremer responds by suggesting joint randomization, i.e. that all close complements 
and substitutes be auctioned simultaneously, with all either randomized to the 
public domain or to private ownership, though not necessarily by the same owners. 
This may, however, not always be administratively feasible, if different inventions 
are produced at different times.  
An alternative market mechanism, still subject to concerns about substitutes 
and complements but avoiding some of the other difficulties, is suggested in a 
footnote by Duffy (2004a, p. 47 n.37). Under this mechanism, the government 
announces an intention to take some intellectual property owned by a publicly 
traded firm, but it does not announce the precise time at which this taking will 
occur. At some moment, trading is suspended and the government announces that 
it has taken the property, but that the takings amount will be paid to the shareholders 
of record at the moment of the taking. Trading is then resumed. Because the rights 
to the takings payment are no longer attached to the stock, the stock price should 
fall. The total takings payment would be equal to the decline in net capitalization. 
An advantage of this mechanism is that it relies on a firm’s own shareholders to 
value its intellectual property. It seems likely to work effectively, however, only 
with relatively high value intellectual property, and there is some danger of noise 
associated with contemporaneous market events. A variation might be for the 
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government to sell derivatives whose value is equal to the stock price decline 
observed over a set time interval and then to reimburse shareholders based on the 
expectation of the stock price decline. Of course, the government must guard 
against stock manipulation; it might help to randomize the exact time to be used for 
measurement of stock value. 
C. Flexible Ex Post Valuation and Hybrid Mechanisms 
A final approach is to allow for a relatively unconstrained assessment of 
social value to be made ex post. This ex post evaluation could be made judicially, 
for example in takings litigation as suggested by Guell and Fischbaum (1995), or 
through some form of administrative process. The case for flexible ex post 
valuation is that even if the government makes large ex post errors, these errors will 
have effects on ex ante investments only to the extent that they are systematic and 
can thus be anticipated. (Abramowicz 2003, pp. 218-224) Some systematic errors 
might exist, however. For example, Khan & Sokoloff (2006, p. 25) demonstrated 
in an empirical study of prize awards that they often depended on factors such as 
elite education and geographical proximity. Perhaps decisionmakers also would 
favor consumer products relative to products that are inputs into other products. It 
is also possible that decisionmakers might adjust based on distributional 
considerations, favoring the poor. Arguably, such adjustments would help 
ameliorate inequality, though whether a reward system is an efficient mechanism 
for redistribution depends on the suboptimality of the existing distribution of 
wealth, as well as on the relative efficiency and plausibility of this mechanism in 
comparison to other vehicles for redistribution, such as taxation.  
 Duffy (2004a, p. 50) points out that if this worked “it could also be applied 
to other fields of natural monopoly or even to government procurement.” That such 
an approach has not been applied even in those contexts may suggest that 
policymakers care about ex post fairness rather than just ex ante efficiency, or that 
policymakers believe that such a mechanism would not be effective. It is also 
possible that ex post valuation is less needed with natural monopoly or government 
procurement, because alternative approaches may be more viable than the patent 
system. Duffy also expresses a concern that flexible ex post valuation systems 
might invite rent seeking (pp. 50-51), citing the pioneer preference program of the 
Federal Communications Commission. This concern is reduced if assessments are 
to be made judicially rather than administratively. 
The most significant advantage of ex post valuation relative to other 
valuation mechanisms is that decisionmakers can in principle take into account the 
full range of potentially relevant considerations. Kapczynski and Syed (2013, p. 
1955) argue that a principle justification for reward systems is that existing 
intellectual property systems, such as patent law, may distort inventor incentives 
toward contributions where excludability is high and away from contributions 
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where intellectual property owners will not be able to police violations. For 
example, the patent system may undervalue inventions whose value will be realized 
only with a long time delay; while the patent system appropriately causes potential 
inventors to discount anticipated revenues to the present, they will ignore 
anticipated use beyond the patent term. Market mechanisms also will not work as 
a mechanism for encouraging subpatentable inventions, i.e. small contributions that 
would not be worth the social cost of a patent but are nonetheless worth 
encouraging.  
A market mechanism that simply attempts to replicate the private value that 
would be achieved by the patent system cannot overcome the limits of such a 
system. It is possible, however, to envision a hybrid system. For example, the 
government might hold a Kremer-like auction to provide a baseline for private 
valuation, but then use flexible ex post decisionmaking to determine the ultimate 
amount to be paid. This would allow the decisionmakers to focus specifically on 
the factors that would cause deviation between private and social value under a 
traditional intellectual property system. Similarly, if the Duffy taking system were 
employed, the government might be allowed to deviate up or down from the stock 
market valuation of a patent based on such considerations. Of course, an auction 
mechanism could also be combined with estimates based on sales. Kremer (1998, 
pp. 1160-61). A flexible ex post valuation could take into account a market 
valuation as well as a valuation based on sales.  
V. COMPARISON WITH TRADITIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
SYSTEMS AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 
The above sketch of the history of prize and reward systems and description 
of design choices hint at the comparison between those systems and existing 
intellectual property institutions. The case for each approach focuses on the flaws 
of the other. A patent or reward system will seem attractive to those who look at 
the patent system and see deadweight loss, inefficient races, and high transactions 
costs. The patent system will seem preferable for those who believe that 
government would be ineffective in determining the appropriate size of awards. 
John Stuart Mill stated this case most famously and perhaps most persuasively: 
[I]n general, an exclusive privilege, of temporary duration, is preferable, 
because it leaves nothing to anyone’s discretion; because the reward 
conferred by it depends upon the invention’s being found useful, and 
the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward; and because it is paid 
by the very persons to whom the service is rendered, the consumers of 
the commodity. So decisive, indeed, are these considerations, that if the 
system of patents were abandoned for that of rewards by the State, the 
best shape which these could assume would be that of a small temporary 
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tax, imposed for the inventor’s benefit, on all persons making use of the 
invention. 
Mill (1858). The advocate of prizes might suggest the reverse deconstruction, 
recommending that the state alter the rewards of the market to account for its 
imprecision in rewarding social value, until ultimately there would be no remaining 
need to grant an exclusive property right and much savings from eliminating the 
patent apparatus. We will not adopt either of these polar opposite positions, but 
instead will consider the comparison along a number of dimensions, with attention 
to the many ways we have identified that prize and reward systems can be 
structured. 
A. Effects on Innovation 
Mill’s quotation embraces the position that patent law is well calibrated to 
reward social value, because private returns will depend on success in the market. 
The views of consumers spending their own money should be preferred to the views 
of bureaucrats spending the money of others, for they may be more influenced by 
political considerations than economic ones. Spulber (2014), for example, 
highlights the Hayekian role that prices serve in a patent system and the difficulty 
that government will have in replicating the invisible hand. Partisans of both 
positions generally agree that the increase in consumer surplus created by an 
invention should count as an increase in social welfare, and so a system that 
provides inventors with some proportion of this increase is generally effective. On 
the other hand, one may argue that “the social worth of a good depends (at least in 
part) on values that are distinct from its utility to consumers.” (Roin 2014, p. 1029) 
This motivates especially proposals regarding pharmaceuticals.  
Advocates of prizes, however, emphasize that the imperfection in the 
correlation between social value created by an invention and the amount that can 
be appropriated by inventors. Appropriability, Kapczynski and Syed (2013) argue, 
depends largely on excludability. Many innovations—such as hospital checklists 
and the provision of information that drugs do not work—are not easily excludable, 
and so these will tend to be underproduced by the patent system. (p. 1908) 
Meanwhile, it may be difficult to monitor infringement with some inventions. (p. 
1917) Some inventions, such as vaccines, may produce high positive externalities 
that the patent system does not value. Fisher and Syed (2012, p. 4) Others may 
produce a high percentage of their social value after the duration of any exclusive 
right, and will thus be underprovided. Finally, relative to social value, there will be 
relatively little incentive to produce discoveries and inventions that have high 
spillovers. Basic research exemplifies this. Patent law rejects patents on abstract 
ideas in part because of the difficulties of defining property rights on such ideas, 
but a prize or reward system can easily incentivize research that cannot be easily 
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monetized through the patent system. Thus, a critical inquiry is to examine what 
proportion of useful research—not necessarily research being conducted, but 
research that might be incentivized either by patents or by prizes or rewards in a 
hypothetical optimal system—is not easily excludable. The higher this proportion, 
the stronger the case for a prize or reward system, though the possibility that other 
systems might be used to encourage such research (such as research grants, to be 
considered below) must also be considered. 
The above are concerns about false negatives—that the patent system does 
not incentivize progress on much important research. But one can also argue for a 
reward system on the ground that patent systems have too many false positives. An 
examination of the literature on the effectiveness of patent offices in weeding out 
low-quality patents is well beyond this chapter’s scope. One who perceives that 
many patents provide outsized rewards for minimal contributions may believe that 
a reward system may be more effective in preventing such distortions. A significant 
challenge in administering a patent system is rendering determinations of whether 
patents are nonobvious. Part of the problem may be that nonobviousness in patent 
law is a binary determination; in a reward system, by contrast, small rewards could 
be given for small degrees of nonobviousness and large rewards, for greater degrees 
of innovation. In principle, patent law can adjust scope based on the degree of 
innovativeness of an invention, but this may not be easy to accomplish 
administratively, and patent offices may not have strong incentives to push back 
against applicants who have made small innovations but claim broad scope. Even 
if these are problems of the patent system, however, the question becomes whether 
the best course is to abandon the patent system or to work to improve the patent 
system from within, for example by increasing the rigor of the nonobviousness 
standard, reforming patent scope, or changing patent litigation procedure. 
In principle, a reward system can consider all forms of social welfare 
produced by an invention, including relatively nonexcludable forms. (A prize 
system, meanwhile, can also be used to reward any sort of creation, but the tendency 
of prize systems to specify one or more areas of interest in advance means that they 
will necessarily exclude consideration of many important discoveries outside their 
scope.) The heart of the objection to a reward system is that such a system may not 
effectively capture the benefits that the patent system misses and moreover may 
misestimate the benefits that the patent system captures. Calandrillo (1998, p. 340 
n.155) notes that historically, prize systems have been rejected for largely this 
reason. Skepticism among economists stems about prizes stems largely from 
distrust of bureaucracies. Scherer (1973, p. 398) argues, “[A]ny bureaucratic 
council entrusted with the job is bound to make mistakes and perpetuate inequities.” 
Similarly, Tirole (1988, p. 401) notes that “[i]nformation about demand is crucial 
for determining the size of the award, which, in turn, influences the research 
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incentives.” It may be difficult to estimate demand when a product is offered for 
free.  
Virtually no empirical progress has been made in addressing these 
questions. Part of the problem, of course, is that we do not have reward systems. In 
principle, however, governmental officials or laboratory subjects might be tasked 
with estimating social value for experimental purpose. But such experiments might 
not be useful. It would be difficult to assess whether estimates of social value were 
correct, though it might be possible to determine whether subjects could accurately 
estimate the private value created by certain discoveries. Perhaps one could 
determine whether subjects were relatively consistent in their evaluations. But as 
long as rewards are given ex post, what matters are ex ante forecasts of evaluations, 
and even highly inconsistent decisionmakers might come close to approximating 
social value in expected value terms. Even if one could measure expectations of 
what average decisionmakers would decide, it may be impossible to know whether 
these expectations represent an improvement over expectations of what the market 
would reward. 
Market mechanisms, like those described in Part IV.B, largely avoid the 
debate on whether patents or rewards are better calibrated to social welfare. Such a 
market mechanism seeks to buy out intellectual property at its private value, so it 
does not entail the risk that government officials will systematically misestimate 
invention value, nor does such a mechanism offer the potential of government 
officials steering inventive activity towards what is socially valuable. Thus, those 
mechanisms must be assessed largely based on their effectiveness at capturing 
private value and on benefits such as reduction in deadweight loss. Such a 
mechanism could be used to provide a baseline compensation level, with 
governmental officials permitted to deviate from that level only within some range. 
One might distrust the government to generate social value estimates of innovations 
being placed in the public domain but believe that governmental adjustments to the 
baseline of private value may improve the correlation between social value and 
private value. 
A final point is that such correlations are not all that matters. A system for 
promoting intellectual property might reward contributions in exact proportion to 
their social value yet still fail if the size of the total contributions is too low or too 
high. An additional consideration is thus whether total incentives to innovate will 
be higher with rewards or with traditional intellectual property. Assuming private 
appropriation is likely to be less than social welfare on average with either system, 
the system that produces greater total rewards may be preferable. Reward system 
advocates highlight that rewards could be augmented to capture social value better. 
Kremer (1998, p. 1411) notes that patent buyouts may be at a multiple of private 
value and suggests that a markup between 2.5 and 3.33 may be socially desirable, 
and Shavell and van Ypersele (2001) point out that if government knows the 
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demand curve, government can play social surplus and achieve a first-best outcome. 
Of course, what the government could do is not necessarily what the government 
will do. Kalil (2006, p. 11) notes that uncertainty of whether the government will 
pay reduces the effectiveness of a prize or reward. If government is thought likely 
to cheat or renege on open-ended commitments, then the optimal policy may be for 
the government to commit to a fixed pot. Abramowicz (2003). This eliminates the 
potential benefit of increasing total funds offered for innovation but also reduces 
the danger of underproviding for innovation, and it may be useful as a transitional 
mechanism, perhaps as a complement to the patent system. 
B. Effects on Redundant Innovation 
Both traditional systems of intellectual property and prize or reward systems 
may lead to inefficient redundant research. In a patent race, multiple competitors 
may attempt the same approaches, though sometimes they will attempt different 
strategies. Sometimes redundant efforts can be welfare-improving, especially 
where an invention has very high social value, but it is not a free lunch. Although 
patent races can lead to earlier invention, the anticipation of competition reduces 
potential participants’ estimates of the expected payout from a race. In equilibrium, 
this can lead to later racing. (Duffy 2004b). Meanwhile, attempts to invent around 
an invention can also lead to inefficient duplication. Redundancy can also occur 
with a prize or reward system. If there is a single prize, the dynamics of racing will 
be quite similar to those in a patent system. With rewards, redundancy may still 
occur, whether competitors believe only the first to complete an achievement will 
receive a reward or whether competitors anticipate that the reward will be shared 
among all participants. Thus, patents, prizes, and rewards may all be inferior in this 
particular respect to a program of centralized government research, which can 
allocate funds to various research programs in a way that attempts to minimize or 
optimize redundancy.  
As this analysis suggests, commentators generally agree that prizes and 
rewards do not necessarily solve the common pool problem. Calandrillo (1998, p. 
353) notes that a “government-run reward system will not solve the race to be the 
first party to generate a given piece of information in order to obtain the reward for 
it,” and Wright (1983) observes that an inefficiently high number of firms may 
respond to a prize incentive.  In principle, however, operators of a reward system 
might seek to adjust rewards or prizes to combat redundancy, just as rewards in 
principle could be adjusted for any other purpose. Roin (2014, p. 1033). The 
problem is that it is not obvious exactly what adjustments should be made.  
One possibility is to give considerably lower rewards where interest in a 
particular inventive path was stimulated by an exogenous shock, such as the 
emergence of a complementary invention. If Invention A enables Invention B, then 
the payment to the first to invent B need not be the full social welfare value of B 
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over A. As noted above, social value is better measured against a baseline of what 
would have been invented absent an incentive, and an extension to this principle is 
that even if some incentive is necessary to encourage innovation, sometimes that 
incentive may be much lower than the full social value of the invention.  Those 
operating the reward system might reduce the ex post award to the level that they 
believe would have produced optimal ex ante entry into the race. Of course, this 
introduces the risk of hindsight bias. 
Another possibility is for the reward judges to provide strong incentives for 
very rapid release of information. If Inventor A performs Step X but does not report 
it, so Inventor B repeats Step X unnecessarily, then the reward judge might allocate 
the proportion of the reward attributable to Step X between Inventor A and Inventor 
B. If Inventor A reports Step X and is the first to complete Steps Y and Z necessary 
to produce the invention, then the case for sharing the reward with a later inventor 
who replicates A’s steps is greatly reduced. Of course, a risk for Inventor A is that 
Inventor B will replicate and invent first. In this case, however, there is a strong 
case for giving Inventor A at least the credit for the portion of the reward 
attributable to Step X and perhaps more, if there was no reason to think that Inventor 
B would make a stronger contribution. A broader observation is that reward systems 
can provide incentives for taking intermediate steps on the way to a discovery, and 
more granular rewards can reduce redundancy. Reward systems may also choose 
to reward negative results. This presents a danger that inventors will choose paths 
that they believe are unlikely to be successful, but also encourages information 
sharing. With this determination as with others, it is difficult to identify principles 
to determine just how much credit should be given. A reward system will generally 
be more attractive if such micro-adjustments successfully adjust for distortions 
attributable to inefficient racing, and less attractive if the government is poorly 
situated to make the adjustments and may overcompensate. 
C. Effects on Commercialization 
Although the goal of the patent system is generally viewed as being 
encouraging research and invention, some commentators have emphasized that 
intellectual property may serve an important purpose in encouraging 
commercialization of invention. The patent prospect theory is widely associated 
with Kitch (1977, p. 277), who argues, “Only in the case of a patented product is a 
firm able to make the expenditures necessary to make the expenditures necessary 
to bring the advantages of the product to the attention of the customer without fear 
of competitive appropriation if the product proves successful.” Kieff (2001) 
extends this insight to the literature on prizes and rewards, noting that if payments 
are given for inventive effort alone, but consumer demand is highly uncertain, then 
second-mover advantages may dominate first-mover advantages. Kieff emphasizes 
that patents serve a role in coordinating inventors and market players.  
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A recent literature has assessed how intellectual property rights might be 
used to further the commercialization function. See Abramowicz & Duffy (2008); 
Sichelman (2010). Hrdy (2015) emphasizes that in fact states frequently give 
awards to encourage commercialization, and these awards can be seen as analogous 
to a reward system. It is possible to imagine channeling such awards into a quasi-
judicial process. Entrepreneurs might be rewarded for bringing products to market 
where consumer demand is highly uncertain and second movers can be expected to 
enter the market. The question becomes whether reward judges can effectively 
determine the magnitude of such rewards and whether inaccurate rewards or 
insufficient attention to the commercialization function might lead to inferior 
performance relative to a patent system. 
D. Effects on Consumers 
1. Deadweight Loss 
The most common justification for a prize or reward system alternative to 
the patent system is that a patent or reward system can reduce or eliminate the 
deadweight loss attributable to patents. The observation that monopolists will set 
output at a level that is inefficiently low from a social perspective is elementary. 
Wright (1983) was the first to develop this advantage of a prize or reward system 
in a rigorous analytical way. One question is how important deadweight loss is 
relative to other systemic imperfections. Arguably, static inefficiency is not as 
important as ensuring that the patent system generates as much economic growth 
as possible, though the dynamic benefits of intellectual property and prizes or 
rewards must be discounted to present value. Another question is how serious the 
problem of deadweight loss is. Leslie (2011, p. 813) notes that patentees may 
reduce deadweight loss by engaging in price discrimination, for example through 
tying arrangements if permitted by antitrust laws. Love and Hubbard (2007, pp. 
1548-49) counter that price discrimination is difficult, arguing that many 
pharmaceuticals are sold only to the world’s richest group of consumers, because 
pharmaceutical companies worry about arbitrage. Roin (2014, pp. 1024-25) agrees 
that the difficulty of stopping arbitrage, combined with the challenge of identifying 
who is unwilling to pay the monopoly price, may make price discrimination 
difficult. But prescription drug insurance produces a two-part pricing that may 
make the two-part pricing achieved by a prize or reward system unnecessary. (pp. 
1048-49) 
The deadweight losses associated with patents must in any event be 
compared against the deadweight losses associated with taxation. Wright’s original 
model featured the simplifying assumption that “lump sum taxation is possible (or 
the marginal welfare cost of general revenue is negligible).” Wright (1983, p. 693) 
But the literature highlights that taxation causes economic distortions. Calandrillo 
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(1998, p. 337); Abramowicz (2003, 200-01). Roin (2014, pp. 1026-27) notes the 
possibility that the loss from taxation might be even higher than the loss from 
patents. On the other hand, Calandrillo (1998, p. 314) suggests that taxes are less 
distortionary, because they apply to all goods or income rather than to just some 
subset of them. Hemel & Ouellette (2013, p. 315) counter that “numerous 
deductions and exclusions … upset this equivalence and increase the distortionary 
effect of income taxation.”  
Whatever the actual distortionary cost of taxation, commentators widely 
agree that there is political resistance to taxation. Hemel and Ouellette (p. 312) note 
that patents are unique in that they do not “necessarily impose a budgetary cost on 
the government (apart from the costs of administering the patent system).” If 
taxpayers prefer, or are more easily fooled by, the implicit taxation associated with 
intellectual property than the explicit taxation necessary for prizes or rewards, then 
prizes or rewards might be politically infeasible. This is not necessarily an argument 
on the merits against prize-or-reward systems, but a corollary may be that prize-or-
reward systems are likely to be underfunded because of their tax cost.  
2. Distribution and Labor Incentives 
A prize or reward system might benefit some consumers at the expense of 
others. Most obviously, if the social value is judged independent of consumers’ 
willingness to pay, for example because health benefits to the poor and rich are 
counted alike rather than based on willingness to pay, then a prize or reward system 
would tend to encourage innovation that benefits both all people, rather than simply 
innovation that benefits the wealthy. Even if the reward is based on willingness to 
pay, there may be a progressive redistributive effect. If marginal cost is sufficiently 
low, the poor can consume a product placed in the public domain, regardless of 
whether their utility is taken into account in the reward calculation. Hemel and 
Ouellette (2013, p. 308) argue that any redistribution’s normative desirability may 
depend on the type of good; that the patent system is subsidized by users may be 
more justifiable for luxury goods (say, improved boat hull designs) than for life-
saving pharmaceuticals. Of course, a normative analysis of any distributional 
consequences depends on one’s views about the existing distribution. In principle, 
one might argue that distribution in favor of the poor would reduce incentives to 
work and thus harm efficiency, though the general assumption in the reward 
literature has been that progressive redistributions would be desirable. 
Not all of a reward system’s distributional effects can be classified entirely 
in terms of effects on the wealthy or the poor. The copyright system can be seen as 
a tax on readers, and the patent system as a tax on users of inventions. Reward or 
prize alternatives continues to provide benefits to those same groups, but the costs 
are imposed more broadly. Whether it is socially desirable, independent of 
efficiency effects, to redistribution from nonreaders to readers or from Luddites to 
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those who enjoy the fruits of invention, is ultimately a normative question. Duffy 
(2004a, p. 44) cites Coase (1946, p. 176) in observing that rewards “would 
redistribute income in favor of those who consume declining average cost goods.” 
Of course, if consumers are relatively homogeneous in their preference for 
declining average cost goods, this may be of little concern. 
E. Transactions Costs 
The costs of administering either a traditional intellectual property system 
or a system of rewards of prizes reduce social welfare. Calandrillo (1998, p. 341) 
argues that “the reward regime would save on the legal, private, and social 
enforcement costs involved in protecting property rights from theft, infringement, 
or copying by others.” These costs are especially significant in the context of the 
patent system, encompassing both governmental and private costs associated with 
the prosecution and litigation of patents. Calandrillo argues that transaction costs 
for both copyright and patent are high in part because of complex doctrine. (pp. 
331-34) Of course, a reward system must evaluate every invention or work and this 
entails some administrative costs as well. Though such evaluations might not track 
traditional doctrinal argument, they might involve complex economic analysis. 
Economists may not come cheaper than lawyers, who no doubt would find a way 
to become involved. Burrell and Kelly (2014, p. 887) argue that historically, the 
administrative costs of prizes may be higher than those of patents. 
A full accounting must take into account not only the costs involved in 
dealings with government agencies and courts, but also the costs associated with 
private negotiation and evaluation. The patent system encourages private ordering, 
but private ordering depends on negotiation by private parties. Those parties may 
be able to find means of reducing their costs, for example by joining patent pools. 
A reward system may reduce the need for private negotiation, because intellectual 
property placed in the public domain can be used without charge. This may be 
especially important in the context of “patent thickets.” (Heller and Eisenberg 
1998) If a sufficient number of inventions are placed into the public domain, 
especially in a mandatory system, enough of the thicket may be cleared to facilitate 
follow-on invention. 
Market-based reward systems must be evaluated separately, because they 
combine elements of the other approaches. Because a market-based reward system 
requires that traditional intellectual property institutions still exist and that patents 
still be obtained, the transactions costs associated with the patent office remain. 
Litigation, however, may be greatly reduced with respect to the patents randomized 
to the public domain. But the market mechanism itself involves transactions costs, 
as auction theory predicts that the private parties participating in a Kremer auction 
will lower their bids to account for their research costs. Such transactions costs may 
be reduced with the Duffy market valuation approach, because each individual 
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shareholder has only a limited incentive to engage in research. But the downside of 
that may be less accurate market valuation. As long as shareholders value patents 
correctly on average, however, this should not adversely affect ex ante investments 
in research, except to the extent that it makes them somewhat riskier. 
F. Rent-Seeking Costs 
Perhaps one of the great achievements of the patent system is that it has 
greatly reduced rent-seeking by inventors seeking special treatment for their 
individual inventions. In principle, Congress can grant patent term extensions on 
an invention-by-invention basis, but because the patent system exists and imposes 
uniform rules governing patent term, this rarely occurs. A concern with the creation 
of a prize or reward system is that owners of rights to inventions might lobby for 
those inventions to receive high rewards. Hemel and Ouellette (2013, p. 327) worry 
that rewards might lead to “politicization, rent-seeking, and mismanagement,” 
pointing out that “the social rate of return on R&D funded through government 
grants has been estimated to be lower than on private R&D.” Duffy (2004a) also 
points out that consumers might lobby for the government to choose products that 
they use to be placed in the public domain.  The investments in such lobbying would 
be social losses, and they might distort decisionmaking. In a judicialized reward 
process, however, it may be possible to maintain decisionmaker independence. In 
that case, rent-seeking could be accomplished only by persuading the reward judges 
of the worth of one’s invention. Inventors, however, may have incentives to mislead 
judges about the value of their contributions, for example by suppressing negative 
studies about their inventions’ effectiveness. 
G. Other Policy Options 
1. Grants 
Most of this chapter has compared traditional intellectual property systems 
to a range of possible prize or reward systems. But these are, of course, not the only 
means by which the government can encourage innovation. An approach closely 
related to that of rewards is grants. Grant decisions are made by centralized 
agencies ex ante based on research proposals. Adler (2011) argues that prize or 
reward systems may be preferable, because the centralized grant decisions limit 
“the range of promising ventures that may receive funding.” Hanson (1998) argues 
that grants have become more important than prizes because they tend to 
concentrate power in the hands of scientific rather than political leaders. While 
legislatures would like to maintain such power in their own hands, the power to 
administer prizes is more likely executive than legislative, and legislatures prefer 
to grant power to scientific leaders than to the executive. The general normative 
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case for grants, particularly for basic research, is that “a large share of the most 
valuable uses of basic research will take highly abstract, intangible forms, rendering 
the output of such research highly nonexcludable.” Kapczynski & Syed (2013, p. 
1951).  
2. Governmental Purchases and Tax Credits 
Above, we noted that the government might create something akin to a prize 
system by giving coupons to low-income consumers. There may also be other ways 
by which the government can help consumers obtain patented products in a way 
that reduces deadweight loss, yet possibly without the need to evaluate the 
contributions of individual inventions. For example, the U.S. government 
subsidizes health insurance through its tax code. Roin (2014, p. 1051) argues that 
this may be administratively much simpler than giving coupons to individual 
consumers. Health insurance creates a two-part pricing scheme for 
pharmaceuticals. Consumers pay a fixed amount for health insurance and then a 
copayment for individual prescriptions. This copayment may be relatively close to 
marginal cost. Roin also argues that the government might combine subsidies for 
health insurance with price controls to ensure that the consumer price ends up 
relatively close to marginal cost. Many national health systems help to drive prices 
for consumers to levels near marginal cost without creating a formal prize system. 
The effect, he argues, is to create the benefits of a patent buyout scheme while 
retaining the system of intellectual property and arguably reducing the 
informational demands on the government. It may not be easy to apply the same 
logic outside the health insurance context, though in principle a combination of 
private ordering and governmental subsidies could reduce consumer costs for other 
goods. Consumers often buy goods (such as cable television subscriptions) with a 
high fixed and low marginal price component, and government policy could further 
encourage this. 
We have, of course, only scratched the surface of the ways in which the 
government can create innovation through its own purchases. Carroll (2009, p. 
1369-70) offers an expanded taxonomy of means by which the government can 
encourage innovation, noting the possibility of “direct provision of creators or 
innovators employed by the government.” Kalil (2006, p. 7) argues that a benefit 
of prize-and-reward systems it that they avoid the complexities associated with 
procurement regulations and can thus attract teams who otherwise would not be 
positioned to do business with the government. Brennan et al. (2012, p. 27) offer 
some guidance on when procurement may be appropriate. While grants will be 
useful when the government wishes to reduce the risks of inventors but does not 
know the best approach to take, procurement will work better for a known objective 
and solution. Prizes may reduce risk somewhat and may be especially appropriate 
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where a specific objective is known but the means to obtain that objective is 
unknown. 
Hemel and Ouellette (2013) argue that tax credits also have potential 
advantages as means of funding innovation. Tax credits require less direct 
governmental involvement and supervision than any of the other methods of 
encouraging innovation. Tax credits, they argue “may be optimal where potential 
innovators have private information about project prospects and limited access to 
outside capital.” (p. 303) Tax credits can be structured as deductions or as 
refundable, which provides stronger incentives for startup companies. Tax credits 
can either be administered at a national level or at a state level. Hrdy (2013) argues 
that in part because a variety of doctrines limit the ability of states to create patent 
policies, states have focused largely on providing tax credits as a mechanism for 
encouraging innovation. As Hrdy’s argument suggests, a significant drawback of 
tax credits relative to rewards is that they provide the government relatively little 
ability to adjust for ways in which the patent system may not align private and 
social incentives. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The arguments for and against prize and reward systems are many and all 
depend on empirical considerations that, without experimentation, are difficult to 
assess with confidence. On one hand, there are strong theoretical reasons that an 
ideal prize or reward system could dominate an ideal patent system because of the 
reduction of deadweight loss and because rewards can be adjusted to encourage or 
discourage any desired or disfavored activity. But no system is ideal. As Kremer 
(1998, pp. 1162-63) points out, new mechanisms will have “risks and 
shortcomings,” but “existing mechanisms of encouraging innovation have serious 
flaws” as well. Thus, a full comparison depends on considerations such as which 
system can better encourage commercialization, which system entails larger 
transactions costs, and which system can best reduce inefficient rent-seeking. 
Perhaps limited governmental experimentation with prize or reward systems can 
reduce some of the uncertainty about these costs, but individual governments may 
have only limited incentives to experiment, particularly given their obligations to 
maintain intellectual property rights under existing trade laws. Perhaps the 
increased scholarly interest in prize and reward systems anticipates increased 
governmental interest in these systems. Levmore (2013) argues that the increasing 
importance of ideas in the modern economy and the difficulty of creating property 
rights in ideas and the drawbacks in enforcing such property rights mean that prizes 
and rewards will take on increasing importance in the future. Pharmaceuticals may 
be the most likely target for experimentation (pp. 156-157), given concerns about 
deadweight loss, scholarly and policy interest in that area, and the already large 
spending and research by governments on health. 
